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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from an order issued in the Second Judicial
District Court, Layton Department, Davis County, State of Utah,
by the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen denying Appellant's Motion
to Suppress and Dismiss.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1996), as the appeal is
from a district court in a criminal case not involving a
conviction of a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Officer Arbogast possessed reasonable

articulable suspicion of criminal activity, i.e., an open
container violation, prior to initiating a traffic stop of the
defendant's vehicle. •
2.

Whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial

hearing by the court.
The standard of review in this case is as follows: "a trial
court determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise
to reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is
reviewable nondeferentially for correctness." State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,
450(Utah 1996) .
However, as the Supreme Court stated in State v. Hodson, 907
P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995), a "measure of discretion" to such
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determinations must be given because the legal standard for
reasonable suspicion "is highly fact dependent and the fact
patterns are quite variable-." Id. at 1157, quoting Pena, 869 P.2d
at 940. Therefore, this Court should review the decision of the
trial court for correctness while affording "a measure of
discretion to the trial court in its application of the
correctness standard to a given set of facts." Chapman/ 921 P.2d
at 450 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 939).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For the purpose of this brief the appellee agrees with and
incorporates here by reference the appellant's statement of the
case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 20, 1997, at approximately 3:50 p.m.,
Officer Bruce Arbogast was on routine patrol in the area of State
Road 126 and 1900 North in Sunset, Davis County, Utah. See
Transcript of Suppression Hearing, Record at 32, 38.
At that time, while facing north in the left turn lane and
while waiting to turn west, Officer Arbogast glanced to the left
at which time he observed the appellant (hereinafter "the
defendant") drinking what he believed to be a beer, to wit: a
Budweiser.

Id. at 32, 52.

Officer Arbogast was approximately six to seven feet from
the defendant's car.

Id. at 34.
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In addition, Officer Arbogast testified at the suppression
hearing that the defendant's car was traveling at a speed of
between five and ten miles per hour.

Id. 33.

Moreover, he

further testified that the defendant's car was in the process of
slowing down for the traffic already stopped at the stop light
that was beginning to start up again. Id. at 33, 38.
Specifically, Officer Arbogast testified that he observed
the defendant drinking from a dark colored bottle with a short
bottle neck that had a red and white colored label or wrapper on
it. ZsL- at 34-35, 42.
Officer Arbogast also testified at tti>e suppression hearing
that the fact that the bottle had a colored label or wrapper on
it was significant to him because in his experience, most dark
brown soda bottles or root beer bottles do not have labels or
wrappers on them.

Id. 43. Indeed, Officer Arbogast testified

that in his experience in 90% of the time bottles with dark brown
coloring and wrappers on them turn out to be alcoholic beverages.
Id. 35.
Also, at the time of the incident in question, Officer
Arbogast had been an officer, whether it was in a reserve
capacity, full-time capacity, or both, for almost 12 months. Id.
at 37-38.
Additionally, Officer Arbogast testified at the suppression
hearing that he had investigated more than 10 cases where he had
recovered alcoholic bottles similar to the bottle he observed in
3

the present case.

Id. at 35.

Most important, Officer Arbogast

testified that in all of the cases he had investigated involving
alcohol, he had never recovered a root beer bottle.

Id. at 56.

Finally, Officer Arbogast testified that if he had observed
a child drinking from the brown bottle observed in the present
case, his suspicions that it was a beer would have been
dispelled.

Id. at 56.

Thus, based on his observation, coupled with his training
and experience in investigating alcohol related offenses, Officer
Arbogast activated his emergency lights on his patrol car, made a
u-turn, and stopped the defendant's car.

;

Id. at 35-36.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
THE TRAFFIC STOP IN THIS CASE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE OFFICER
ARBOGAST POSSESSED REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
SUSPICION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, I.E., AN OPEN
CONTAINER VIOLATION, PRIOR TO INITIATING A TRAFFIC
STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
Appellant argues that Officer Arbogast did possess
reasonable articulable suspicion to justify his traffic stop of
the defendant's car under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

Because Appellant does not specifically

challenge the search in this case under Article I Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution, Appellee will not engage in a separate
state constitutional analysis.
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THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED A FAIR AN IMPARTIAL
HEARING BY THE COURT BECAUSE THE COURT DID IN FACT
ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO ASK ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
OF OFFICER ARBOGAST AFTER THE STATE HAD CONCLUDED
ITS EXAMINATION OF THE OFFICER
Appellant contends that the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen
was both attentive at the suppression hearing and equitable in
allowing the Appellee to present his case.

Indeed, the record

unambiguously demonstrates that Judge Van Wagenen allowed the
Appellee to continue questioning Officer Arbogast although the
Appellee would have this Court believe otherwise.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
Turning first to the question of reasonable suspicion, the
State notes generally the applicable law.

In Salt Lake City v.

Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1996), this Court reiterated the
long standing principle that in order for an officer to legally

ieffect a temporary seizure, "the officer must have 'articulable
suspicion' that the suspect has or is about to commit a crime.
. ."

IsL. at 1006; See

also State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah

1996) (a police officer may detain and question an individual
when the officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that the
person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity.)
In the present case, the defendant states that the sole
basis for Officer Arbogast's stop is "that he observed Appellant
5

take a drink from a brown colored bottle when he glimpsed at
Appellant as Appellant was passing the officer's patrol car at an
estimated speed of seven miles per hour, which would equate to a
rate of ten feet per second." See Appellant's Brief at 7.
However, these facts as set out by the defendant do not
accurately tell the whole story.

Officer Arbogast testified that

he observed the defendant drinking from a dark colored bottle
with a short bottle neck that had a red and white colored label
or wrapper on it. Id. at 34-35, 42.
In fact, Officer Arbogast testified that the label or
wrapper was particularly significant to him because in his
experience, he had never encountered dark brown soda bottles or
root beer bottles with labels or wrappers on them.

Id. 43.

Furthermore, Officer Arbogast testified that based on his
experience in 90% of the time bottles with dark brown coloring
and wrappers on them turn out to be alcoholic beverages.

Id. 35.

Additionally, at the time of the incident in question,
Officer Arbogast had been a law enforcement officer for almost 12
months. Id. at 37-38.
Also, Officer Arbogast testified at the suppression hearing
that he had investigated more than 10 cases where he had
recovered alcoholic bottles similar to the bottle he observed in
the present case.

Id. at 35.

Most important, Officer Arbogast testified that in all of
the cases he had investigated involving alcohol, he had never
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recovered a root beer bottle.

Id. at 56.

Finally, Officer Arbogast testified that if he had observed
a child drinking from the brown bottle observed in the present
case, his suspicions that it was a beer would have been
dispelled.

Id. at 56.

However, he did not observe a child.

He

observed the defendant, who is an adult.In the State's view, the foregoing observations, coupled
with Officer Arbogast's experience, not only are specific and
articulable as defined by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and
its progeny, but also are sufficient to support a finding of
reasonable suspicion under this Court's decision in Provo Citv
Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993) .
In Spotts, while on routine patrol, an officer observed the
defendant in that case in his truck taking some "hits" from a
small cigarette which appeared to her to be a "joint." However,
the officer admitted at trial that she did not know whether a
hand-rolled tobacco cigarette would burn in a way significantly
different from a marijuana joint.

Id. at 438-439.

Also, there

is no indication from the Court's opinion that the officer ever
explained why she believed the hand-rolled joint, based on its
shape and size, contained marijuana instead of tobacco.
Rather, the statement of facts in the Court's opinion simply
points out that the officer could see that the cigarette was
smaller than a manufactured cigarette and that, in the officer's
opinion, it had the distinctive shape of a joint.
7

Id.

Thus, based on the factual circumstances present in that
case, the defendant in Spotts argued on appeal, as does the
defendant in the present case, that the officer did not observe
any activity inconsistent with innocent behavior.

Id. at 439.

In fact, the defendant in Spotts specifically argued that his
conduct was just as consistent with that of an individual smoking
a hand-rolled tobacco cigarette.

Id. at 440.

However, this Court in Spotts stated unambiguously that
"where a defendant's conduct is ^conceivably consistent with
innocent . . . activity,' but is also ^strongly indicative' of
criminal activity, we will not hesitate td conclude that
reasonable suspicion exists.

Id. quoting State v. Menke, 787

P.2d 537, 541 (UtahApp. 1990).
In the instant case, there is little, if any doubt, that
this Court's decision in Spotts is both analogous and
controlling.

Indeed, the defendant applies by analogy the

marijuana joint hypothetical in the last paragraph of his
argument on reasonable suspicion to suggest the result advanced
by the defendant in Spotts.

However, the result the defendant

suggests, i.e., that this Court find that Officer Arbogast did
not have reasonable suspicion because the conduct of the
defendant was just as easily innocent as it was criminal, is
simply misplaced given this Court's holding in Spotts.
Hence, based on the holding in 'Spotts, the State
respectfully urges this Court to find that Officer Arbogast had
8

reasonable articulable suspicion to justify his traffic stop of
the defendant's car.
POINT II
Turning finally to the question concerning the fairness and
impartiality of the suppression hearing, and the attentiveness of
Judge Van Wagenen, the State contends that the arguments advanced
by the defendant are meritless.

Indeed, although the defendant

seeks to give this Court the impression that he was cut-off in
the middle of his examination of the officer, such was not the
case.
In fact, a careful review of the transcript of the
suppression hearing clearly indicates that while the State only
asked questions totaling approximately seven (7) pages of hearing
transcript, the defendant was allowed to ask questions totaling
approximately 19.5 pages of hearing transcript.

Moreover, even

though the Court suggested to the defendant that he had asked
enough questions, the Court nevertheless, allowed the defendant
to continue to examine the officer.

Indeed, in this regard the

transcript of the suppression hearing bears this out as follows:
MR. DI REDA: May I ask just one more question?
won't even stand up to do it, just one.
FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. DI REDA:
Q

Of all the cases you've investigated
involving alcohol, how many cases would
you say you've investigated where you've
9

I

discovered root beer bottles?
A

None.

MR, DI REDA: That's all I have.
MR. CARDON: Your Honor?
THE COURT:

No. You don't get one more. You've
had enough. Haven't you really?

MR. CARDON: I ought to follow that up.
THE COURT: Oh. follow it up, then go ahead.
FURTHER RECROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. CARDON:
Q

At this point you'd only been an officer for
six months, is that correct?

A

At the time of the stop?

Q

Right.

A

As a full time officer, yes.

Q

And in fact as of right now you've got three
times the amount of time in that you had
then, is that correct?

A

It is.

MR. CARDON: Nothing further.
THE COURT:

Alright you may step down. Mr.
Cardon, I assume, is this all the
evidence we're going to hear?

MR. CARDON: Yes, it is, Your Honor.
See transcript of suppression hearing at 56-57.
The foregoing exchange unquestionably indicates that the
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Court was both fair and impartial in allowing the defendant to
examine Officer Arbogast.

There is simply nothing in the record

or anywhere else to suggest otherwise.
As an additional matter, to the extent that the defendant
claims the Court was inattentive because Judge Van Wagenen
thought that Officer Arbogast's use of the term wrapper meant a
"brown bag, the State admits that it was confused by the use of
the term wrapper as well.
The problem that existed during this portion of Officer
Arbogast's testimony stems from the fact that Officer Arbogast
used the term wrapper and label interchangeably.
view, this confusion is easily understood.

In the State's

In fact, when the

Court inquired further of Officer Arbogast as to what he was
specifically referring, Judge Van Wagenen stated, "So are you
talking label then," to whi.ch Officer Arbogast responded by
stating, "Yes, I'm sorry the label on it."

See Transcript at 46-

47.
The foregoing excerpt from the hearing indicates that even
the officer perceived the confusion he had created by using the
terms wrapper and label synonymously.

Indeed, that is why he

apologized.
Thus, for the above-stated facts and reasons, the State
respectfully asks this Court to find that the hearing was both
fair and impartial.

11

CONCLUSION
For the facts, reasons, and case law stated above, the State
respectfully asks this Court to affirm the decision of the trial
Court in denying the defendant's motion to suppress.
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